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ABSTRACT. This article analyses the relationship between religion, secularisation
and nationalism in Quebec and the Basque Country using a comparative approach. I
will first outline the ethnic-religious origin of these nationalist movements. Second, I
will examine the extent to which the ‘new’ secular and violent nationalism (Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna and Front de Libération du Québec) that emerged in the 1960s was fuelled
in its origin by a transfer of sacrality. Third, I will address an aspect that has led some
theorists to view religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena, in which national-
ism is construed as a religion of blood sacrifice. Fourth, I will examine another aspect
that leads to this view of religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena, as the
latter also provides a framework of transcendent meaning through an imaginary of
continuity between the different generations. The article concludes with a series
of general considerations on the relations between nationalism, secularisation and
religion.
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Religion plays a central role in debates on the origin and foundation of
nationalism and nations. Some authors highlight its importance in conforming
ethnic and national communities, while others point to the eminently religious
or sacred character of nationalism. The transcendence of the issue is such that
Gellner (1994) indicated that the ‘problem’ of nationalism is its propensity to
sacralise nations. Many theorists explain the origin of nationalism from dif-
ferent perspectives by relating it to the process of secularisation and seeing it as
a type of substitute religion, its functional equivalent, or even the religion of
modernity (Anderson 1991; Durkheim 1964; Gellner 1983, 1987; Greenfeld
1996; Hayes 1960; Kapferer 1988; Llobera 1994;Marvin and Ingle 1999; Smith
1989, 2000; etc.).2 However, despite the wealth of these interpretations, the
polysemic nature of the concepts of religion and nationalism has often caused
the debates on these issues to be less fruitful than could be desired. To bring a
degree of analytical clarity, Brubaker (2012) recently proposed four ways of
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fruitfully studying the relation between religion and nationalism. The first is to
treat religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena. The second is to
specify ways in which religion helps explain things about nationalism (its
origin, its distinctive character, etc.). The third is to treat religion as part of
nationalism, and to specify modes of interpenetration and intertwining. The
fourth is to posit a distinctively religious form of nationalism.
This article explores some issues in the three first approaches proposed by
Brubaker for the cases of the nationalist movements in Quebec and the Basque
Country. The objectives are twofold: on the one hand, to offer an innovative
comparative approach, in view of the scarcity of works comparing these two
movements, and contribute to a greater understanding; and on the other, to
evaluate certain general theories that relate nationalism with secularisation
and religion. I will first outline the ethnic-religious origin of these nationalist
movements, thereby challenging the theories that see the birth of nationalism
as the product of secularisation. We will also see, from a comparative
approach, how religion intertwined with traditional nationalism contributes to
fixing the boundaries of the imagined national community. Second, I will
examine the extent to which the ‘new’ secular and violent nationalism (Euskadi
Ta Askatasuna [ETA] and Front de Libération du Québec [FLQ]) that emerged
in both the Basque Country and Quebec in the 1960s was fuelled in its origin
by a transfer of sacrality from religion. This, in turn, triggered a process of
heterogony of ends whereby the nation became a new absolute – an end in itself
– and not simply a means or path to salvation as it was in traditional nation-
alism. Third, I will address an aspect that has led some theorists to view
religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena, in which nationalism is
construed as a religion of blood sacrifice. To what degree can there be said to
be an inexorable relationship between nationalism, violence and the sacred?
The comparative analysis of the Basque and Québécois nationalist movements
is an opportunity to problematise this thesis. Fourth, I will examine another
aspect that leads to this view of religion and nationalism as analogous phe-
nomena, as the latter also provides a framework of transcendent meaning
through an imaginary of continuity between the different generations. I will
analyse from a comparative approach how the Québécois and Basque nation-
alist movements have shaped this imaginary of continuity through the
sacralisation of history and territory. The article concludes with a series of
general considerations on the relations between nationalism, secularisation
and religion deriving from the comparative analysis of the Basque and
Québécois cases.3
‘Catholics above all’: the religious mission of traditional nationalism
The case of France after the Revolution (1789) has long been the benchmark
for the study of the relation between secularisation, nationalism and religion
(Durkheim 1964). The secularisation of Christianity left a void that was filled
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by the new religion de la patrie. However, the criticisms of modernisation and
secularisation as general theories have called into question the universal appli-
cation of the French experience. Alongside this case, there are others in which
nationalism emerged in a period of intense religious feeling, and it was pre-
cisely this backdrop that allowed the nation to be imagined based on the
boundaries of religion. This was the case – with minor differences – of nation-
alism in the Basque Country and Quebec.
Nationalism in Quebec in its origins was conformed in a strongly religious
context in which Catholicism was an important ethnic marker that contributed
to defining the boundaries of the national French-speaking community. Even
if Canadian nationalism proclaimed a secular ideology after the British ‘con-
quest’ (1760), there is no doubt that the Catholic religion was an essential
element in defining the nation due to its deep roots among the population.
After the defeat of the Patriots (1837–1838), the Act of Union (1840–1841) and
the creation of a federal state (1867),4 religion became an even more important
element for the new French-Canadian nationalism. This nationalism considered
that the political and economic development of the nation had been inter-
rupted, and believed the only path to follow was that of survival; in other
words, to safeguard what they had and dedicate themselves to the cult of the
French tradition. Thanks to its control over social life, the Catholic Church
was the only institution strong enough to take on this task and stand as the
guarantor of the nation’s destiny (Balthazar 1986: 71).
The early decades of the last century saw the apogee of this French-
Canadian nationalism, whose principal exponent was the priest and historian
Lionel Groulx (1878–1967), who saw the nation and its Catholic faith as being
inextricably intertwined. His nationalism was subordinate to his Catholicism,
which needed the former in order to survive: ‘I am Catholic for reasons not due
to my patriotism, but I am patriotic for many reasons that are due to my
Catholicism’ (Groulx, cited in Arès 1968: 938). Surrounded by a ‘protestant
ocean’, Groulx believed that the mission of the French-Canadian people was to
guarantee the survival of the Catholic faith: ‘We believe the indications of
Providence to be sufficiently clear. The destiny She has outlined for us in
America, the heritage she has bequeathed us seems to us to be worthy of
safeguarding at any price’ (Groulx, cited in Ferretti and Miron 1992: 94). The
nation had contributed to the development of the Catholic faith, while at the
same time Catholicism had allowed the nation to remain alive. Without
Catholicism the nation was nothing (‘we will be Catholic or we will be
nothing’), as it was its very essence and the main diacritical trait that allowed
it to define the boundaries of the national community. The other traits that
distinguished the French-Canadians, such as the French language and their
French origin and tradition (assimilated to the idea of race) and the rural way
of life, were not such determining factors in defining the nation. Thus, the
language, which after the second half of the twentieth century would become
the primary trait of the new national definition, was not for Groulx the
‘essence’ of the nation but rather the guardian of the faith: ‘our language can
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only remain if our priests keep our beliefs, main support of our nationality
(. . .) Language, guardian of French type, is the main guarantee of national life
for our people (. . .) and the hope of survival for catholic people’ (Groulx, cited
in Senese 1979: 168).
As in Quebec, nationalism in the Basque Country did not emerge as a
substitute for religion. Quite the opposite: it cannot be understood without the
religious climate from which it arose. It is true that late nineteenth century
Basque society had shown signs of creeping secularisation. But the birth of
nationalism was not the result of this process; rather it was the consequence of
the difficulties it ran into attempting to flourish among sectors of Basque
society governed by a deeply rooted mythical-religious tradition harking back
to the sixteenth century (Corcuera 2001). Nationalism did not therefore
replace religion but was instead largely the adaptation of religion to a new
social context characterised by the onset of industrialisation and the influx of
immigrants to the Basque Country. On this point, Sabino Arana (1865–1903),
the founding father of Basque nationalism, could be said to have acted as a
‘prophet of renewal’ for an ethnic religion which was deeply entrenched in
earlier generations and whose popularity had spread throughout the nine-
teenth century (Aranzadi 2000: 490).
The religious element was fundamental in the origins of Basque nationalism
for confirming the boundaries of the imagined community, although – unlike
Quebec – the ethnic groups (Basque and Spanish) in the Basque Country were
not distinguished by religion, as both were Catholic. But this did not prevent
it from becoming – like race – the trait used to draw the boundaries of the
national community. For Arana, the racial purity of the Basque people was
very closely linked to Catholicism, whose integrity needed to be preserved
from the degradation – he maintained – it was suffering at the hands of the
‘maketos’5: ‘We Basques must avoid mortal contagion and maintain steadfast
the faith of our ancestors and the solemn religiosity that distinguishes us and
purifies our customs, which before were healthy and commendable and today
are largely infested and threatened with corruption from outside influences’
(Arana, cited in Solozábal 1975: 362). Like Groulx, Arana also considered the
nation and Catholicism to be inexorably entwined, as evidenced by his mottos
‘Jaungoikoa eta Lagizarra: God and the ancient law’ and ‘Gu Euzkadirentzat ta
Euzkadi Jaungoikoarentzat: We for Euskadi, Euskadi for God’. He also placed
God above the homeland, although to serve him it was necessary to be a
patriot: ‘Ideologically speaking, God comes before the homeland, but in prac-
tical terms and in time, here in Bizcaya it is necessary to be a patriot to love
God, and it is necessary to love God to be a patriot; because He is an essential
part of our patriotic motto’ (Arana 1995: 223). The ultimate goal for Arana
was eschatological salvation and this informed his nationalism and his com-
mitment to independence: ‘Saving our brothers, providing them with adequate
means to achieve their ultimate goal: this is the only true nationalism. (. . .) and
even independence itself (. . .) has no further value beyond that of a simple
means, although final and necessary, to the same end (. . .) A Bizcaya
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dependent on Spain cannot address God and cannot be Catholic in practice’
(Arana, cited in Corcuera 2001: 354–5). We can therefore see the religious
mission Arana assigned to nationalism, which ‘had produced a greater number
of more solid and enduring fruits than could be achieved by many groups of
religious missions together in restoring faith to those who had gone astray and
reaffirming faith in believers’ (Arana, cited in Corcuera 2001: 354). This was
the religious mission of nationalism, and thus both the political objectives and
the other traits of the nation were no more than means in the service of this
mission. This is the case of language, which as in Quebec was the guardian of
the faith and the race, but not the defining element of the nation6 which it was
to become after the 1960s.
It can therefore be said that traditional nationalism – both Basque and
French-Canadian – did not arise as a result of secularisation, nor did it play the
role of a substitute or functional equivalent of religion, but rather that it acted
in some way as a means that was regarded as being essential to achieving
salvation. This is why nationalism originally took on the overtones of a reli-
gious mission. On this point, it is worth recalling the words of Weber (1978:
925): ‘The earliest and most energetic manifestations of the idea (of nation), in
some form, even though it may have been veiled, have contained the legend of
providential “mission” ’. Both French-Canadian and Basque nationalist
movements are founded on adaptations of the myths of ethnic election that
have played a part in the genesis and development of ethnic and national
communities, as – again according to Weber (1978: 391) – ‘behind all ethnic
diversities there is somehow naturally the notion of the “chosen people” ’.
More recently, Smith (1999: 332) has demonstrated that nationalism ‘draws
much of its passion, conviction and intensity from the belief in a national
mission and destiny; and this belief in turn owes much to a powerful religious
myth of ethnic election’. In Quebec and the Basque Country, we see two
examples of the most widespread version of these myths, consisting of the
belief that the divinity has chosen a particular ethnic group to carry out a
mission, such as defending the divinity’s representatives on Earth, converting
pagans to the one true religion, extending the kingdom of God, and so on
(Smith 2003: 49).7 From this standpoint, and in line with Weber’s sociology of
religion, Arana and Groulx can be considered as ‘emissary or ethical proph-
ets’, ‘instruments’ of the divinity who believed they had been entrusted with a
mission or mandate (Weber 1978: 447).
From traditional nationalism to ‘secular’ nationalism: the transfer of sacrality
and heterogony of ends
The 1960s and 1970s brought major social changes both in Quebec and the
Basque Country (industrialisation, urbanisation, secularisation, etc.), which
saw the transformation of the national identity, and particularly the disap-
pearance of the pivotal role of religion. The reference to the religious mission
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in defining the nation was still in evidence in Quebec in the late 1950s, as seen
from the ideology of L’Alliance Laurentienne, which claimed that its nation-
alism, ‘based on the love of the French-Canadian nation (. . .), is legitimate, as
it conforms to the divine order. That love (. . .) is founded on the Catholic and
French mission that has been bequeathed to us and that we must (. . .) per-
petuate’ (L’Alliance Laurentienne, cited in Ferretti and Miron 1992: 121).
With the arrival of the 1960s and 1970s, the processes of social change men-
tioned above and the influence of the Révolution tranquille8 gradually under-
mined the basis of the rural way of life, distancing the Québécois people from
the Church, and thereby breaking the historic alliance between the nation and
Catholicism. These years witnessed the emergence of new nationalist organi-
sations with a secular, lay, progressive, socialist and revolutionary agenda,
among others, as in the case of the Rassemblement pour l’Indépendance
Nationale, the Parti Québécois (PQ) and the FLQ, for whom the French-
Canadian race and Catholicism were no longer the defining traits of the
nation, but had been replaced by the language (French).
As in Quebec, the 1960s and 1970s in the Basque Country were also a time
for redrawing the boundaries of the imagined national community. Here too
religion and race gave way to language (Euskera) as the defining trait of the
‘national we’.9 The Basque Country saw the emergence of a new generation of
nationalists who rebelled against the Franco regime and served as the breeding
ground for ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom), whose objective was to
re-establish and revitalise nationalism through violence.10 Its early ideological
precepts reveal a continuity with traditional nationalism, but a rupture with its
two fundamental principles: race and religion (Gurrutxaga 1985; Jáuregui
1981: 88). In the case of religion, in response to the postulations of Arana, the
first militants of ETA considered that – in spite of the Basques’ deep-rooted
links with Christianity – religion and homeland should not be conflated: ‘For
the sake of the homeland, we cannot demand a religious position. This does
not mean we deny the irrefutable transcendence of Christianity in Basque
history, (however) we believe the Basque nation should be constituted as a
secular state’ (ETA, cited in Jáuregui 1981: 131).
Nevertheless, both in Quebec and the Basque Country, this ‘new’ nation-
alism which proclaimed itself to be secular was fed by transfers of sacrality,11
which had their origins in religion. In the first case, as described by Rocher in
1973: ‘The resurgence of nationalism in Quebec in the last few years can be
attributed not only to objective causes, but also – at least in part – to religious
transfer. One part of religious mysticism that the Church has been unable to
assume or absorb has extended beyond it to become invested with a new
nationalist mystique’ (Rocher, cited in Couture 1994: 18). In a similar line,
Zylberberg (1994: 96) indicates that the transfer of sacrality between religious
and political spheres challenges the ‘apparent secularisation of issues in pro-
gressing from an ethnic vision which prioritises the Catholic faith of French-
speakers, to a more pagan worldview based on the land, language and culture’.
Similarly, various scholars of Basque nationalism have highlighted the transfer
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of sacrality from religion to the nation that took place from the 1960s
onwards: ‘Religious fervour in certain people has been distorted into extreme
nationalist fervour. To schematise this, it could be said that the “cult of God”
has given way to a wholesale transfer of its emotional charge to the “cult of
Euskadi” ’ (Elzo 1994: 545). Similarly, the sociologist Beriain maintains that
‘there has been a transfer of numinosity from the “absolute other” (God,
Jaungoikoa) to the “generalised other” (the people of a nation); the presence of
supernatural beings has been replaced by the sacralisation of the social con-
struct of the “people of the nation”, and this emerges as the new secularised god
of our time, the new object of cult, which will generate its own sacrificial altars’
(Beriain 2000: 19).
There are numerous testimonies from members of ETA particularly, and to
a lesser degree of the FLQ, revealing that many of them previously held strong
religious convictions which they abandoned when they took up the nationalist
cause. Thus the anthropologist Alcedo, the author of some important field-
work consisting of interviews with ETA militants, reports that ‘many of the
respondents (say) their initiation in militancy marked the end of their religious
practice and sometimes even of their belief (. . .) A sizable proportion of young
people (in ETA) in the generation of the 1960s (. . .) were fervent believers who
then became alienated to varying degrees from the influence of the Church’
(Alcedo 1996: 92–3).12 Similarly, in Quebec, the process of secularisation
around this time caused the sacred to be displaced to the realm of nationalism,
which received transfers of sacrality from religion (Couture 1994: 212). In
psychoanalytical terms, it has even been suggested that ‘once the space became
vacant, once the totality of the Church had been banished from the field of
nationalism, the super-ego could not exist without another totality that would
replace it’ (Lazure 1970: 32). Thus, according to this author, ‘there are vestiges
of religion remaining lodged in the super-ego of young people that influence
and colour their nationalism (. . .) The pro-independence super-ego of young
people stems largely from the secularisation of religious nationalism’ (Lazure
1970: 27–8). Quite apart from the fact that it may be deemed controversial to
explain nationalism by means of psychoanalysis, it is certainly true that some
testimonies of Québécois pro-independence militants endorse this idea of the
transfer of sacrality. By way of illustration, we could refer to the words of one
of the ideologues of the FLQ, Pierre Vallières: ‘I wanted the Québécois to base
their freedom on purely human values. But at the same time I was obsessed by
a certain need for the Absolute, for human values based on some kind of
transcendence, and to define this transcendence (. . .) even atheistic I was a
believer, I was looking for God’ (Vallières, cited in Couture 1994: 151).
This process of transfer of sacrality that took place in Quebec and the
Basque Country resulted in the creation of a new absolute: the nation. Com-
pared to traditional nationalism in which the nation was in the service of
religion, in the ‘new’ nationalism, it was religion that was subordinated to the
new absolute, which no longer needed religion in order to prosper. We can see
in the origin of both Basque and Québécois secular and violent nationalism a
126 Jose Santiago
© The author(s) 2015. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2015
process of heterogony of ends, similar to the one described by Weber in The
Protestant Ethic. According to his famous thesis, the means or paths to salva-
tion through which ascetic Protestantism sought the certitudo salutis became –
as an unintended result – ends in themselves, thereby fuelling the ‘victorious
capitalism’, which – once developed – no longer needs to be buttressed by
religion (Weber 1930). Similarly, we see how, in secular nationalism, the
nation, which for Arana and Groulx was a path to salvation, is transformed
into an end in itself, a new absolute that no longer needs to be buttressed by
religion. The cases of Basque and Québécois nationalism are a good illustra-
tion of the following observation by Greenfeld (1996: 181): ‘Even where reli-
gion was a crucial factor in the development of nationalism and a source of its
initial legitimacy (. . .), even where it played midwife at the birth of nationalism
and protected it in its infancy, religion was reduced to the role of a
handmaiden, an occasionally used tool, and came to exist on nationalism’s
sufferance’.
Following this line of analysis, traditional nationalism can be conceived as
a vanishing mediator. Jameson (1974) used this concept to account for ancient
prophecy and ascetic Protestantism within the framework of Weber’s sociol-
ogy of religion. Both played the role of mediating between two opposing logics
after which they disappeared, since their action triggered a permutation
between means and ends. Likewise, traditional nationalism also acts as a
vanishing mediator between religion and secular nationalism:
Religion
Traditional nationalism
(vanishing mediator)
Secular
nationalism
Religious ends + + −
Nationalist means − + +
Nationalist violence, secularisation and the sacred
According to Durkheim’s thesis (1964), the founding category of religion is the
sacred, which originates from the social bond and whose function is the
cohesion of the community. Following this theory, Marvin and Ingle, in their
book Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, hold nationalism and religion to be
analogous phenomena due to the fact that, in both cases, it is sacrificial
violence, the hidden foundation of the sacred, that enables social cohesion:
‘The underlying cost of all society is the violent death of its members. Our
deepest secret, the collective group taboo, is the knowledge that society
depends on the death of these sacrificial victims at the hands of the group itself’
(Marvin and Ingle 1999: 21). In other words, sacrificial violence is the mecha-
nism whereby nations are conformed.
In my opinion, although sacrificial violence may play a pivotal role in the
conformation and development of nations, it cannot, however, sustain a
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general theory of nationalism that is supported by this line of reasoning. Thus,
the comparison of Basque and Québécois nationalism may be useful in exam-
ining certain important aspects of the relationship between the national com-
munity, nationalist violence and the sacred. Contrary to the theories that refer
to the ‘violent essence’ of the nation, I consider it more productive to analyse
both the material and symbolic backdrops against which the nationalist vio-
lence develops.
Previously, we have seen how the ‘new’ nationalism that arose in Quebec
and the Basque Country in the 1960s and 1970s was fed by transfers of
sacrality deriving from the secularisation process. This transfer of sacrality,
which transformed the nation into a new absolute for which certain nation-
alists were prepared to kill and be killed, has sometimes been used to partly
explain the violence perpetrated by ETA and the FLQ. However, the dis-
similar thrust of the violence in the Basque and Québécois nationalist move-
ments should give us cause to explore other factors in greater depth. It is
evident, both for ETA and the FLQ, that violence has an instrumental
dimension as a means to achieve political objectives. Here we need to look
carefully at the different socio-political contexts in which the violence
occurred in both cases. It should be noted that, at the outset, ETA’s violence
was essentially viewed by its militants as a response to the violence perpe-
trated on Basque society by Franco’s dictatorship. Subsequently, in the
democratic period, ETA conceived of the violence in more strategic terms as
a means of achieving its political objectives.13 In the case of Quebec, the
violence of the FLQ took place in a socio-historical context where there was
a degree of legitimisation of political violence, inspired by Marxism and
Third-Worldism. As we shall see below, after the 1970 crisis and the rise of
the PQ, the ideologues of the FLQ came to believe that the use of violence
was not an effective strategy for achieving their political ends. Considering
the importance of the instrumental political dimension of violence and the
ideological concepts whereby it is legitimised, what follows is not intended as
an explanation of the origin and development of the violence in Quebec and
the Basque Country that focuses on the ‘sacred dimension of nationalism’
(Smith 2000). My aim is simply to highlight the different material and sym-
bolic contexts in which the nationalist violence developed in relation to the
process of secularisation and with the sacred as an element of cohesion for
the national community.
The process of secularisation in the 1960s and 1970s in Quebec and the
Basque Country not only had consequences on the domain of people’s con-
sciences but also on aspects of a material nature. Thus, in the case of
Quebec, secularisation gave rise to a French-speaking middle class coming
from Church institutions in the area of health, education, and so on, who
felt thwarted by the social impediments that hindered their social mobility
due to the scant development of the provincial administration and the
English-speaking minority’s control of the private sector (McRoberts and
Posgate 1976: 88). It is therefore no coincidence that these new middle
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classes were the primary defenders of the Quiet Revolution which created the
conditions of social change that enabled their social mobility (Guindon 1998:
65–6). This experience in Quebec serves to illustrate the hypothesis that
‘there is a close –although not deterministic– link between the accelerated
process of secularisation and the emergence of middle-class nationalism’
(Waldmann 1997: 69). According to Waldmann (1997: 71), secularisation
brings a considerable decline in ‘the appeal of a career within the ecclesias-
tical institutions, the classic route for advancement for ambitious intellec-
tuals in the preindustrial age. The only organisation that can replace it,
because it can offer similar opportunities for enrichment, is the public
administration, which is why the aspirations of the new “secular” middle
class concentrated on the creation of a new autonomous national State’. In
other words, unlike what occurred in the Basque Country, the Quiet Revo-
lution and the development of the administrative apparatus in the province
of Quebec allowed the social mobility of important nationalist contingents
who had become distanced from the Church, thus laying the ground for a
less traumatic process of secularisation. The perception of lack of future
opportunity and the hindrances to mobility as a result of the decline of what
had been the core institution in the history of the French-Canadians were
palliated by the development of an administrative apparatus that offered
future prospects for the French-speaking community. In contrast, in the
Basque Country of the 1960s, the centralism of the State under the Franco
regime meant that culture in Euskera inhabited the ‘silent society’. With the
onset of violence by ETA, one part of the nationalist community, which had
formed into groups of Catholic militants under the protection of the Church,
abandoned this institution and became visible in the public sphere.14 Zulaika
(1990: 32) refers to this period of history thus: ‘ETA’s weapons have brought
Basque youth out of the churches and the seminars’.
Let me now take a look at another issue of a symbolic nature that bears
a close relation to the thesis of Marvin and Ingle. The idea is to analyse
comparatively how sacrificial violence acted as an element of cohesion for
the national community. In the Basque Country, one of the results of the
processes of secularisation and transfer of sacrality we saw earlier was that
the members of ETA came to conceive ‘politics as a sacrament’ (Zulaika
1990). In his book Violencia Vasca, Zulaika shows how ‘the desacralisation
of religious symbols and rites led to an emphasis on the resacramentalisation
of life as a whole (. . .) Priests could become secular, but the other side of the
coin was that everyone has a share in the priesthood that resides –in the final
analysis– in the community of believers. The realisation of this sacramental
commitment in the political sphere was illustrated unequivocally by the sac-
rifices of the members of ETA’ (Zulaika 1990: 325). Thus, ‘the nationalist
population perceived the patriotism of their martyrs in ETA within a frame-
work of transcendence originally learnt in the Church’ (Zulaika 1990: 308).
The members of ETA were hence conceived as martyrs who laid down their
lives for the community. According to Juaristi (1999: 114), ‘abertzalismo
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(Basque nationalist movement) as a whole needed the violence of ETA to
force the transfer of sacrality to the nation, the only means of rebuilding the
nationalist community’. From this analytical standpoint, this historian inter-
prets the murder of the first deliberate victim of ETA, the civil guard
Pardines, and the subsequent death of the ETA militant Etxebarrieta as
follows: ‘The Basque-nationalist community rebuilt itself on a covenant of
blood (let the blood of Pardines be on our heads and that of Echevarrieta on
theirs). The bulk of Basque society gave their tacit consent to the death of
the civil guard by construing the ETA member as an innocent victim’
(Juaristi 1999: 129). In line with the hypothesis of Girard, the sacred made
its appearance around the death of an expiatory victim, who thereby became
an essential element in the symbolic cohesion of the nationalist community.
The emergence of ETA also played a central role in delimiting the bounda-
ries of the ‘national we’, which had become blurred in comparison to tradi-
tional nationalism due to the abandonment of race and religion as ethnic
traits, and their substitution by the Basque language, which had been sig-
nificantly weakened. According to Aranzadi (2001: 514), it was in this prob-
lematic ideological scenario that ‘ETA inclined towards “armed struggle”:
violence and death –a more powerful socio-symbolic mechanism than any
ideology– burst onto the stage bringing blood and fire to brand the new
“Basques” with a cohesive and differentiating mark’. It could be said on this
point that, in the absence of traits of sufficient weight to mark the bounda-
ries of the national community, it was violence that acted to reinforce these
boundaries (Conversi 1994).
The case of Québécois nationalism is very different. In the first place, it is
worth noting that no member of the FLQ died in confrontations with the
forces of law and order. There was therefore no sacrificial victim to play the
role of martyr for the national community. In second place, the entry on
the scene of the FLQ did not take place in a ‘silent society’, as occurred in the
Basque Country with ETA, but – as we have seen – came at a time when
Québécois nationalism began to feel it was beginning to take control of its own
national destiny. But on the matter of the cohesion of the national community,
it is worth highlighting the role of the PQ as the primary symbolic reference. A
highly significant element here is the decision of the erstwhile ideologue of the
FLQ, Pierre Vallières, who in 1971 renounced terrorism and abandoned the
organisation when he conceded that the existence of the PQ had rendered it
superfluous.
In short, we can conclude that, in this symbolic dimension, the fundamental
difference between the Québécois and Basque cases lies in the fact that, in the
latter, nationalist violence played a key role in permitting the symbolic cohe-
sion of the nationalist community, which had been repressed and silenced in
the public sphere. In contrast, the nationalist community in Quebec was by
then undergoing a process of expansion, with the symbolic reference of the PQ,
and did not require the recreation of the national community through
violence.
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The sacralisation of history and the territory: the construction of an imaginary
of continuity
Anderson (1991: 10) has indicated that ‘if the nationalist imagining is so
concerned (with death and immortality), this suggests a strong affinity with
religious imagining’. He therefore considers that nationalism must be under-
stood by aligning it with other earlier cultural systems such as religion. As with
religion, nationalism provides a system of meaning which makes sense of
contingency through the secular transformation of fatality into continuity.
Nationalism thus offers a framework of immortality and transcendence. This
thesis is also shared by Smith (1989: 362): ‘only in the chain of generations of
those who share an historic and quasi-familial bond, can individuals hope to
achieve a sense of immortality in eras of purely terrestrial horizons. In this
sense, the formation of nations and the rise of ethnic nationalisms appears
more like the institutionalisation of a “surrogate religion” than a political
ideology’.
If nationalism is a device similar to religion insofar as it provides a frame-
work of transcendence,15 this is due to the imaginary of continuity it constructs
whereby the nation is ‘imagined’ as a chain of generations stretching back into
the distant past with its roots buried illo tempore. How is this imaginary of
continuity created? Anderson (1991) has outlined the temporalities that make
it possible to ‘imagine’ the nation. On the one hand, new time as a modern
perception of time, and on the other, old time with which this new concept was
conflated, thereby launching the ‘process of reading nationalism genealogically
-as the expression of an historical tradition of serial continuity’ (Anderson
1991: 195). This old time is what makes it possible to establish a line of
continuity with the roots of the nation that stretches back through the ages
almost to time immemorial. These so-called golden ages play a pivotal role in
the construction of this imaginary of continuity, as they allow all the genera-
tions who see themselves as descendants of the ancestors living in this golden
age to be linked together, thereby creating a feeling of national identity (Smith
1997: 48–52). These glorious eras have come to represent essential elements in
the sacralisation of the national history, as they furnish a narrative of the
nation in spite of the transformations that may have occurred in the national
identity.
In the case of traditional Basque nationalism, old time was conformed by
appealing to a golden age characterised by a divine language (Euskera), laws
based on nature (the Fueros), political independence, nobility, and racial and
religious integrity. The touchstone for this golden age was the Basque society
of the Old Regime, which was sacralised by the Catholic religion and peasant
mythology (Aranzadi 2000: 491). But what of the case of this appeal to an old
time in Quebec, given that the nation cannot hark back to a premodern age as
distant as that of the nations of the old Europe? Or to echo the historian
Bouchard (2001: 34): ‘How does one overcome the original impasse of the will
to claim ancient roots in a collectivity which, by definition, is at point zero on
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the timescale? In other words, how does one construct a long memory on the
basis of a short history?’ In Quebec, the search for this old time of the nation
was built by referring to The New France, the golden age for the French-
Canadian people that would ultimately be traumatically transformed with The
Conquest, with which traditional nationalism returned the nation to a primor-
dial time, a mythical time whose ‘roots reached back into the most distant past
of France, the land of founding ancestors, in the great mother country. This
link guaranteed the fragile nation an invaluable symbolic anchor’ (Bouchard
2001: 118). Groulx highlighted the imaginary of continuity of the French-
Canadian nation thus: ‘The birth of a race in Canada does not in any way
imply the rupture of that new race with its old French past’ (Groulx, cited in
Bouchard 2001: 119).
As we see, traditional Basque and French-Canadian nationalism con-
formed their imaginary of continuity by appealing to a golden age which,
concurring with the national definition of Arana and Groulx, was character-
ised by being a period of both racial and religious purity. But what happens to
the imagining of national continuity in Quebec and the Basque Country in the
1960s and 1970s when the definition of national identity changes and the
racial-religious concept of the nation is cast aside? In other words, how does it
become plausible to ‘imagine’ a nation that has seen a transformation of the
diacritical traits used to set down the boundaries of its community?
The ‘new’ nationalism therefore needed an imaginary of continuity which
– due to the new secular and antiracist ideas – could no longer be supported
by a golden age based on racial and religious purity. Thus, secular Basque
nationalism began to ‘desecrate’ the medieval golden age of traditional
nationalism by denying that Catholicism was an essential characteristic of
the Basque nation: ‘due to its late Christianisation a certain tendency to
natural religion can be observed among the Basques, with some ethnologists
claiming that the Basques are only notionally Christian’ (Sarrailh de Ihartza
1973: 76). The championing of this pagan religiosity, which would be con-
served as a result of the supposed late Christianisation of the Basque
Country, would allow the Basque nation to discover its roots deep in its
prehistory, in a period that came to be considered the new golden age
(Aranzadi 2000).
In the case of Quebec, the reconstruction of an imaginary of continuity has
been perhaps more complex insofar as the new nationalism – born of the Quiet
Revolution – represents the ‘Québécois’ nation as ‘new’, thereby breaking with
the very denomination of French-Canadian. But is the ‘new’ nationalism really
represented to the Québécois nation as a new entity different from the French-
Canadian nation? Emphatically not, as this nation is considered a link in a
long historical continuum which allows the new time to be confronted by
appealing to an imagined national continuity. To demonstrate this, it may be
worth analysing the following passage from the PQ’s 1991 programme: ‘Cana-
dians of the seventeenth century, French-Canadians of the nineteenth-century
and now Québécois, rarely have we seen a people so yearn for an identity, and
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thus embrace the essential with such persistence’ (PQ, cited in Ferretti and
Miron 1992: 300). It is clear here that the PQ is appealing to the persistence of
one people. However, the very mention of Canadians, French-Canadians and
Québécois appears to refer to different identities. To what extent do French-
Canadians, for whom race and religion were the inalienable traits of the
nation, and the Québécois, who have broken with these characteristics as
markers of the ‘national we’, belong to the same nation?
To respond to this discontinuity, both Basque and Québécois national-
isms need to sacralise history by showing that beyond the different diacritical
traits that have delimited the boundaries of the national community
throughout history, a line of continuity exists between the different genera-
tions. The changes in these boundaries must be confronted by appealing to
the existence of the nation illo tempore. As clearly noted by Pérez-Agote
(1995: 132), the nation ‘needs to sacralise the history of the production of the
group as though it were the history of the group, by reasserting its original
existence’. Given the discontinuities and interruptions in the boundaries of
the national community, nationalism needs a foundation that enables the
continuity between generations. And it finds it in the territory, whose role
lies in being the recipient that allows the national subject to persist through-
out time, despite the transformations in the national identity. As indicated
by J. Anderson, ‘the territory is the receptacle of the past in the present’
(Anderson 1988: 24). It allows the temporal vertebration of the nation: ‘the
time has passed but the space is still there’, thus making possible the imag-
ined continuity (Anderson 1988: 24). As Smith (1998: 64) maintains: ‘To
create a nation it is necessary to have a historic territory to love and defend,
and whose “ownership” is recognised by all and sundry. This is essential to
any ideology of nationalism. It is therefore logical that a significant part of
any concept of “national” identity stems from the process of signalling, out-
lining and reinterpreting an authentic homeland linking the dead, the living
and the yet unborn’. This is why nationalism sacralises the territory ‘as a
unique and distinctive “historic territory” whose identity is linked to
memory, and a memory embedded in the land. History nationalises a piece
of land and imbues its most characteristic elements with mythical content
and sacred sentiment. The territory thus becomes the receptacle for a col-
lectively shared consciousness’ (Nogué 1998: 74). Much has been made of
the importance of collective memory for the construction of national iden-
tity, but not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the national
collective memory is confirmed with respect to a particular territory – what
Smith (1996: 454) has termed the territorialisation of memory. The aim of
nationalism is that the land – the homeland – is never forgotten; it has been
‘theirs’ for generation after generation. Thanks to this sacralisation of both
history and territory, the nation is presented to us as a device of meaning
with a transcendental character: ‘situating the community in an ancient and
disjointed birthplace (. . .) is essential to evoke the primordial and transcen-
dental features of the nation’ (Smith 1998: 64).
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Conclusion
I will end by highlighting some questions of a general nature for each of the
sections above on the theory of enlightened nationalism based on the com-
parative analysis of the relations between secularisation, nationalism and reli-
gion in the cases of Quebec and the Basque Country. In the first place, the
ethnic-religious origin of the Basque and French-Canadian nationalist move-
ments is a further example contributing greater complexity to the relation
between nationalism and religion, and distancing it from general models
derived from specific experiences such as the case of France. In this respect, I
agree with Greenfeld (1996: 176), when she states that ‘the varied and complex
history of the relationship between nationalism and religion cannot be nar-
rowed to a linear sequence’ whereby nationalism was bound to emerge to
replace religion once the secularisation process was underway. In contrast to
these linear, evolutionist and teleological models, empirical analyses reveal the
multiple forms of relationship between religion and nationalism, among which
we would have to include the French case as a specific example (Rieffer 2003;
Spohn 2003). In second place and in the same line, I would like to suggest that
we should be wary of these linear and ‘compensatory’ models which set out to
explain the persistence of ‘secular’ and violent nationalism as the fruit of the
transfers of sacrality that ‘compensate’ the void left by religion. As we have
seen, we can indeed find in these transfers a considerable impetus for the origin
of the secular and violent nationalism that emerged in Quebec and the Basque
Country in the 1960s and 1970s. In this period, we see a large number of
militants in ETA and the FLQ who transferred the sacrality of their former
religious life to the new absolute of the nation. However, in contrast to the
hypotheses of some authors (Elzo 1994; Sáez de la Fuente 2002), we cannot say
the same of the new generations of militants in ‘radical’ Basque nationalism,
where we find young people, most of whom have never been socialised in a
religious context and have therefore not undergone the process of transfer of
sacrality to fill the void of religion. Third, the comparative analysis of the
relation between nationalist violence and the sacred in the cases of Quebec and
the Basque Country leads us to problematise general theories such as that of
Marvin and Ingle on the function of sacrificial violence in conforming a
nation. As we have seen, the martyrs of ETA succeeded in playing a unifying
role in the national community in the years of the Franco regime. However, in
recent years, it has been precisely the violence of ETA which has broken the
‘symbolic continuum of (Basque) nationalism, by prioritising the internal
dimension of the Basque conflict over the external’ (Pérez-Agote 2001: 134).
The case of Quebec is a clear example of how the absence of violence has been
a decisive factor in achieving the cohesion of the national(ist) community.
Finally, the comparative analysis of the Basque and Québécois cases has
revealed how nationalism is a powerful device of meaning thanks to its capac-
ity to generate an imaginary of continuity through the sacralisation of history
and the territory. This fact has led some authors to see the phenomenon of
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nationalism as being analogous to religion as it provides a framework of
transcendence. However, in response to the theories that consider religion as
equivalent to nationalism, and see nationalism as the religion of modernity, we
must take into account the specificity of religious and national communities.
As Schnapper (1993: 158) points out: ‘A reference to matters transcendental
will not hold the same meaning as an inscription in a historic community nor
as a political project. The meaning experienced through religion is not that of
a “secular religion” ’. In this respect, I agree with this sociologist when she
concludes that ‘it is too simplistic to describe nationalism as “a substitute or
supplement for supernatural, historical religions” or to state that nationalism
has become a surrogate religion (. . .) A transcendental relationship is a dif-
ferent experience altogether from a political project, even when the latter takes
on an emotional quality’ (Schnapper 1993: 158).
Notes
1 I would like to thank Alfonso Pérez-Agote for his friendship and generosity in these recent
years when I have had the good fortune and pleasure to work with him on a range of research
projects. I refer particularly here to project CSO2010-16148 from the MINECO (Spain), on which
we worked within the Groupe Européen de Recherche Interdisciplinaire sur le Changement Religieux
(GERICR).
2 For a critical review of these approaches relating secularisation and nationalism, see Santiago
(2012).
3 An interesting line of research concerning the relationship between nationalism, secularisation
and religion that is not explored in this article examines the nationalists’ view of the values (what
degree of secularity) that should serve as the foundation for their nation. On this point, it is very
interesting to study the debate sparked in Quebec by what was known as the Quebec’s Charter of
Values.
4 The Act of Union joined lower and upper Canada under the same government, which included
no French speakers. With the creation of the federal state under the name of Canada – thus
implying the application of the term ‘Canadians’ to all the inhabitants of the nation-state – the
former Canadian community came to be known as ‘French-Canadian’.
5 Derogatory term used by Arana to refer to the Spanish.
6 Arana put it as follows: ‘Not speaking one or another language, but the difference in language
is the primary means of preserving ourselves from contagion from the Spanish and avoiding the
intermingling of the two races. If our invaders were to learn Euskera, we would have to abandon
it’ (Arana 1995: 301).
7 The other more minority version of these myths of ethnic election is the one based on the idea
of the pact between the divinity and the chosen people (Smith 2003: 49).
8 The name Révolution tranquille (Quiet revolution) refers to the fact that, without any major
convulsions, Québécois society was radically transformed in the economic, social and cultural
sphere.
9 This was the view of Federico Krutwig (Sarrailh de Ihartza), the ideologist of ETA in the 1960s
and 1970s: ‘There is no doubt that an individual with all his Castilian, Gascon and French
surnames who speaks the Basque language fluently is more Basque than another individual,
however “Euskaldun” (Basque) his surnames may be, who speaks often and ill of oppressive States
but does not learn or use the Basque language in his daily life’ (Sarrailh de Ihartza 1973: 91).
10 To understand the radicalisation of Basque nationalism, it is vital to take into account the
effects of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. See Pérez-Agote (2006: 55–118).
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11 The historian Mona Ozouf (1976) uses this concept of transfer of sacrality to refer to the
process that took place with the French Revolution, whereby the sacrality of the Catholic religion
was transferred to the new religion of the homeland.
12 See also Jáuregui (1981) and Pérez-Agote (1984).
13 On the history, ideology and the strategic evolution of ETA, see Elorza (2000), Ibarra (1987),
Jáuregui (1981) and Letamendia (1994). For a greater understanding of the discourse, organisa-
tion and expressions of radical Basque nationalism, see Mata (1995).
14 To understand the relationship between this public silence and violence as an expressive
language, see Pérez-Agote (2006: 98–102).
15 In order to account this framework of transcendence and the affinity that exists between
religion and nationalism, it is important to consider the concept of ‘civil religion’. Bellah described
this civil religion as a collection of beliefs, symbols and rituals that sanctified the national
community and conferred a transcendental purpose to the political process (Bellah 1970).
Rousseau was the first to use the term ‘civil religion’. He envisioned a religion of sociability, a
religion of the citizen, whose contents were not the dogmas of traditional religions but rather the
sentiments of sociability that all citizens should have (Rousseau 1973). For a critical review of the
relationship between civil religion and nationalism, see Santiago (2009).
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